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Abstract
In order to promote rapid development of IPTV, we need 
to coordinate the coopetition relationship between SARFT 
and telecom operators. Considering the substitution effect 
of IPTV to traditional TV, the paper builds a coopetition 
model and explores their choices of coopetition strategy 
and optimal yield decisions under the different level of 
profit-sharing based on Stackelberg game.The results show 
that:SARFT should provide IPTV with most program 
resources.The optimal coopetition strategies are different 
if the profit-sharing that SARFT gets is at different stages. 
The profit-sharing between SARFT and telecom operators 
should be controlled in the neighborhood of seven-three to 
choose the mutual cooperation strategy, getting the highest 
profit than others under the optimal coopetition stategies 
that they select when the profit-sharing is at other stages.
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INTRODUCTION
IPTV combines the advantages of radio and television 
media and network, and provide customers with high 
quality services as online consulting, online shopping 
etc. In China, the State Administration of Radio, Film, 
and Television (SARFT) holds the licese and is in charge 
of the integrated broadcast rights of IPTV, the telecom 
operators(TC) occupies the broadcast channel with the 
resources of Internent broadband exports and Internet 
Date Center(IDC), it can promote rapid development of 
IPTV if they cooperate with each other. However, they 
are independent and array with each other at present, the 
coopetition relationship between them is always difficult 
to reconcile, resulting in the slow development of IPTV in 
China (Deng, 2011).
Scholars conducted some researchs on the coopetition 
relationship between them. Focusing on the acces to 
policy, QIN Zi-xing et al (2008) built a competive model 
and applied the modified Stackelberg game in analyzing 
the optimal yield under the lax and strict control policy, 
drawing the conclusions that lax control policy was 
favorable for IPTV expanding in the phase of promotion. 
Hu-Lei et al (2011) took the mobile TV as example after 
getting consumer’optimal consumption flow based on the 
utility fuction and built a cooperative modle to analyze 
their optimal price strategy based on Stackelberg game 
where SARFT was the leader.
However, these studies had only focused on the 
competition or cooperation and not involved in the 
situation where both competiton and cooperation existed. 
Base on the policy of Triple-play in China, the TC who 
meets the requirement can engage in the production 
of radio and television programs in additon to current 
political affairs. Namely, TC can invest into making 
content and provide to the integrated broadcast platform 
of IPTV to compete with SARFT while he is cooperating 
with SARFT to develop IPTV, but the audit and broadcast 
of content are still controlled by SARFT. The SARFT can 
develop IPTV through Two-way network reconstruction 
while he is cooperating with TC. Yu Tongshenet al 
(2011) considered the policy and analyzed their choices 
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of propeling strategy. But they only brifely discussed 
their strategy in theory based on pigs’payoffs and didn’t 
have the deeply quantitative analysis on the coopetition 
relationship. So, the article builds a coopetition model 
where both competiton and cooperation exist and 
discusses their choices of coopetition strategy and 
optimal yield decision under the different level of profit-
sharing based on Stackelberg games, hoping to enrich 
the theoretical research and pomote the healthy and rapid 
development of IPTV in China.
1.  THEORETICAL BASIS AND THE 
DESCRIPTION OR ASSUMPTIONS OF 
THE MODEL
1.1  Introduction to the Theory of Coopetition
In actual operations, competition and cooperation among 
enterprises usually occur at the same time, the profit comes 
from not only the competition, but also the cooperation. 
Hamel et al (1989) firstly concerned that the enertprises 
could carry out both competition and cooperation among 
them during the management. Brandenburger et al (1996) 
defined it as “coopetition” firstly and applied game theory 
in describing the phenomenon that both competiton 
and cooperation exist. However, Bengtsson et al (2000) 
indicated that the coopetition was a behavior that the 
competing companies in the industry cooperated in the 
activities away from the customers and competed in the 
activities close from the customers.
For the coopetition types, it is mainly classified 
according to the characteristics of competition. Wilkinson 
et al (1994) took the relationship between the supply chain 
upstream and downstream as pointcut and divided it into 
four kinds: coopetition pattern under high cooperation and 
high competition, partner pattern under high cooperation 
and low competition,conflict pattern under low cooperation 
and high competition, dependent pattern under low 
cooperation and low competition. Luo et al (2005) 
took the horizontal relationship as pointcut and divided 
the coopetition relationship among the multinational 
corporation and its major competitors into four kinds: 
cooperative pattern under high cooperation and high 
competition, partner pattern under high cooperation and 
low competition, battle pattern under low cooperation and 
high competition, isolated pattern under low cooperation 
and low competition.
1.2  Description of the Model
In China, SARFT holds the licese and is in charge of 
the integrated broadcast rights of IPTV, TC occupies 
the broadcast channel with the resources of Internent 
broadband exports and IDC, they can mutually cooperate 
to develop IPTV. Meanwhile, SARFT can develop IPTV 
itself through Two-way network reconstruction, and 
TC can invest into making content and provide to the 
integrated broadcast platform of IPTV to compete with 
SARFT. So, the coopetition between them can be sloved 
rely on the coopetition theory. As shown in Figure 1, 
SARFT cooperates with TC through the profit-sharing, 
SARFT is responsible for providing content and gets β of 
the income, TC is responsible for conveying and gets (1-
β) of the income, we suppose the yield is q1.SARFT also 
can process the Two-way network reconstruction at the 
unit cost c3, we suppose the yield is q3. TC also can make 
content at the unit cost c2, we suppose the yield is q2.
Figure 1
The Model of Coopetition Strategy Between SARFT and TC
1.3  Assumptions of the Model
(1) The price of IPTV meets the inverse demand 
function P (Q) =a-bq, a>0, b>0.
(2) The development of IPTV will bring competition 
to traditional TV resulting in the loss of users. We assume 
the loss of profit to traditional TV is the strictly negative 
correlation with the yield of IPTV and the coefficient 
values is –k. In other words, each unit increaces of IPTV, 
the loss of the average profit to the traditional TV is k;
(3)Without loss of generlity, we assume a>>c2, a>>c3, 
a>>k.
(4)SARFT has the advantage in contenrt and doesn’t 
need fees in content to launch IPTV. TC has the advantage 
in channel and doesn’t need fees in coverying. 
(5)The article focuses on the coopetition relationship. 
We don’t consider the impact of the integrated broadcast 
rights on the content which TC provides in order to 
facilitate the analysis. In other words, we assume the 
content which TC provides to the integrated broadcast 
platform of IPTV passes the audit and is allowed to play.
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2.  ANALYSIS OF THE COOPETITION 
STRATEGY BETWEEN SARFT AND TC
2.1  Coopetition Model
The demand of SARFT is the converying channel and 
TC’s is the content. So, SARFT would certainly hand his 
whole or a part of content over TC to convery if only the 
profit-sharing is suitable when TC is willing to convery 
them. SARFT controls the integrated broadcast rights and 
TC needn’t fees in converying, so TC would certainly 
apply his whole or a part of channel in converying content 
if only the profit-sharing is suitable when SARFT is 
willing to provide content.
So, their profit-functions are:
( ) ( )1 1 2 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 2 3( )G q a bq bq bq q a bq bq bq c k q q qπ β= − − − + − − − − − + +
( ) ( )1 1 2 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 2 3( )G q a bq bq bq q a bq bq bq c k q q qπ β= − − − + − − − − − + +
 (1)
( ) ( )2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 3b (1 )D q a bq bq q c q a bq bq bqπ β= − − − − + − − − −
 (2)
SARFT has rich resource in content and can invest into 
Two-way network reconstruction. TC
also can invest in making content, but it can’t be 
comparable with SARFT’s content in a short term. So, 
SARFT is the leader and TC is the follower. According to 
the Stackelberg game, the follower (TC) decides his yield 
based on the leader’s (SARFT’s) and the leader will also 
adjust his output after predicting the follower’s (TC’s).
In the coopetition relationship, SARFT and TC have 
two choices: competition and cooperation as shown in 
Table 1. There havn’t cooperation if both of them choose 
competition, so q1=0.SARFT wouldn’t invest into Two-
way network reconstruction if TC chooses competition 
and SARFT chooses cooperation, so q3=0. TC wouldn’t 
invest into making content if TC chooses cooperation and 
SARFT chooses competition, so q2=0. Both of them will 
cooperate with each other to develop IPTV if both of them 
choose cooperation. At that time, TC wouldn’t invest into 
making content, SARFT wouldn’t invest into Two-way 
network reconstruction, q2= q3=0.
Table 1
The Choose of Coopetition Strategy
                  SARFT
TC Competition Cooperation
Competition q1=0 q3=0
Cooperation q2=0 q2=q3=0
2.2  Solution
(1)Highly Competitive Pattern where both TC and SARFT 
are in competiton
TC will invest into making content and SARFT will 
invest in Two-way network reconstruction if they choose 
competition, there don’t exist any cooperation, so q1=0. 
The advantage of this pattern is that it can help speed up 
the enterprise transformation of SARFT and enhance its 
market-oriented experience. Meanwhile, it contributes for 
further subdividing the consumer markte, reducing market 
monopoly, improving the service quality and reducing 
service cost. The disadvantage is that SARFT’content 
can’t be used by TC needing TC to invist into making and 
TC’s network can’t be used by SARFT needing SARFT 
to invist into Two-way network reconstruction, resulting 
in advancing their cost to develop IPTV, and eventually 
leading to SARFT’finanical pressure, their advantage 
of resources can’t be effectively shared, wasting the 
resources and so on. This pattern can be referred to 
as Highly Competitive Pattern because the degree of 
competition in this pattern is the highest, their profit-
functions are:
( )1 3 2 3 3 2 3( )G q a bq bq c k q qπ = − − − − +  (3)
( )1 2 2 3 2bD q a bq q cπ = − − −  (4)
As the follower, TC will decide his yield based on 
SARFT’s and SARFT will adjust his yield after predicting 
the TC’s, TC’goal is to maximize profit, his optimal 
choice meets:
1 2 2 3 2 2/ b 0D q a bq q c bqπ∂ ∂ = − − − − =  (5)
So, q2=(a-c2-bq3)/(2b) (6)
SARFT aims at profit maximization and decides his 
optimal yield rely on TC’reflection function as the leader: 
1 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3/ ( / 1) ( / 1) 0G q a bq bq c bq q q k q qπ∂ ∂ = − − − − ∂ ∂ + − ∂ ∂ + =
1 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3/ ( / 1) ( / 1) 0G q a bq bq c bq q q k q qπ∂ ∂ = − − − − ∂ ∂ + − ∂ ∂ + =  (7)
So:
2 3
3
2 3
2
2
2
3 2
4
a c c k
q
b
a c c k
q
b
+ − − =
 − + + =

 (8)
Substitute q2, q3 into the profit-functions of SARFT and 
TC, we can get
2
2 3
1
2 2
2 3 2 3
1
( 3 2 )
16
( 2 ) (6 2 4 )
8
D
G
a c c k
b
a c c a c c k k
b
π
π
 − + +
=

+ − − − − + =
 (9)
(2)Lowly Cooperative Pattern where TC is in 
competition and SARFT is in cooperation
S A R F T w o n ’ t  i n v i s t  i n  Tw o - w a y  n e t w o r k 
reconstruction and gets profit only by providing TC with 
content and TC will not only cooperate with SARFT by 
converying but invist into making content to develop 
IPTV himself when TC chooses competition and SARFT 
chooses cooperation, so q3=0. The advantage of this 
pattern is that SARFT avoids the finanical pressure in a 
short time helping exert his advantage of content. The 
disadvantage is that the IPTV of SARFT competely 
relys on TC going against the enterprise transformation. 
Meanwhile, TC will invist in making content adding the 
cost of IPTV. This pattern can be referred to as Lowly 
Cooperative Pattern because TC who has extesive 
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experience in market not fully focuses on the cooperation 
and the degree of cooperation in this pattern is low, their 
profit-functions are:
( )2 1 1 2 1 2( )G q a bq bq k q qπ β= − − − +  (10)
( ) ( )2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2(1 )D q a bq bq c q a bq bqπ β= − − − + − − −
(11)
Similarly, we get their optimal production decisions 
and their profits:
2
1
2
2
2 2
2 2
2
2 2
2 2 2
2
k
2
(3 2) (2 ) (2 )
4
(a c ) (6 2c )
8b
( ) (8 ) (8 14 )a (8 2 )
16
G
D
a cq
b
a c kq
b
a k k
a k c c kc
b
β
β β β
β
π
β β β β
π
β
+ − =

− − + + −
=


+ − − + =

+ + + + − − − =
 (12)
Now, the price of IPTV is: P=a-bq1-bq2= (a+c2+k)/4
The price must be higher than k, so a+c2>3k (13)
(3)Lowly Competitive Pattern where TC is in 
cooperation and SARFT is in competition
When TC chooses cooperation and SARFT chooses 
competition, TC won’t invist in making content but 
only gets profit by converying content and SARFT will 
not only cooperate with TC but also invist in Two-way 
network reconstruction to develop IPTV himself, so q2=0. 
This pattern has some advantages as following: Firstly, 
TC who has extesive experience in market fully focuses 
on the cooperation and contributing to the consumer 
market development and degree of cooperation. Secondly, 
the whole content comes from SARFT fully exerting his 
adavantage of content to provide consumer with high 
quality of service. Thrid, SARFT’ marketing pressure is 
small to develop IPTV himself and contributing to his 
enterprise transformation and accumluating experience 
gradually. The disadvantage is that the degree of market 
competition is low and it is not conducive to upgrading 
the products and improving the level of service. This 
pattern can be referred to as Lowly Competitive Pattern 
because TC who has extesive experience in market fully 
focuses on the cooperation and SARFT who is in the 
enterprise transformation develops IPTV independently 
and the degree of competition is low, their profit-functions 
are:
( ) ( )3 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3( )G q a bq bq q a bq bq c k q qπ β= − − + − − − − +
 (14)
( )3 1 1 3(1 )D q a bq bqπ β= − − −  (15)
In this pattern, there is no decision of TC and his profit 
fully relys on q1 and q3. As the leader of 
Stacklberg game, SARFT’profit fulluy depends on his 
own decision variable; SARFT takes it as goal to maxmize 
profit. Their profit and q1 or q3 are:
3
1 2
3
3 2
2
3 3 3
3 2
2
3 3
3 2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
q
(1 )
( 1) 2 (1 )
q
(1 )
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )( ) (1 )
(1 )
G
D
a c k
b
a c k
b
ac ak kc c
b b
a k c c
b
β β β
β
β β β β
β
β β β
π
β β
β β
π
β
− − + + − = −
 − + − −
= −
 − − + = −
 − −

− + − + = −
 (16)
(4)Highly Cooperative Pattern where both TC and 
SARFT are in cooperation
TC won’t invist in making content and SARFT won’t 
invist in Two-way network reconstruction
when they both choose cooperation, they cooperate 
mutually to develop IPTV, SARFT is responsible for 
providing content and TC for converying, so q2=q3=0. 
The advantege is that it’s easily to carry out, TC doesn’t 
have to spend resources on making content and SARFT 
doesn’t have to spend huge fund in constructing network, 
it fully realizes the complementation of their strengths 
and their cost are lower. Meanwhile, TC who has extesive 
experience in marke is responsible for developing the 
market and SARFT who has the advantage on content 
is responsible for providing content, it contributes to the 
rapid development of IPTV. The disadvantage is that 
SARFT doesn’t involve in market against accumulating 
experience. Meanwhile, it easily forms market monopoly 
against upgrading product and improving the level 
of service. This pattern can be referred to as Highly 
Cooperative Pattern because there doesn’t have any 
competition and the degree of cooperation is higer, their 
profit-functions are:
( )4 1 1 1G q a bq kqπ β= − −  (17)
( )4 1 1(1 )D q a bqπ β= − −  (18)
In this pattern, there is no decision of TC and his 
profit fully relys on q1. As the leader of Stacklberg 
game, SARFT’profit fulluy depends on his own decision 
variable, SARFT takes it as goal to maxmize profit, his 
optimal decision meets:
4 1 1 1/ (a ) k 0G q bq bqπ β β∂ ∂ = − − − =  (19)
So, 1 ( k)/(2 )q a bβ β= −  (20)
Substitute q1 into the profit-functions of SARFT and 
TC, we can get
( )
( )
2
4
2 2 2 2
4
k / (4 b)
(1 ) / (4 )
G
D
a
a k b
π β β
π β β β
 = −

= − −
 (21)
2.3  Discussion
We get the conditions for existence of the four 
patterns during gett ing their  optimal solutions, 
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H igh ly  Compe t i t i ve  Pa t t e r ’s  i s  a+c 2-2c 3-k>0 , 
a-3c2+2c3+k>0,  Lowly Cooperat ive Pat tern’s  is 
a+c2-k>0,
2
2
2a 2c 2k
1
3 k ca
β
+ −
< <
− − , Lowly Competitive Patter’s 
i s
2
3 3 3
3
a k 2c (a k 2c ) 4ak
2
a c k
a a c k
β
− − + − − + − +
< <
+ +
,  H i g h l y 
Cooperative Pattern’s is β>k/a. As a >> c2, a >> c3, a >> k, 
we assume a+c2-2c3-k>0, a-3c2+k>0,
and
2
2 2 3 3 3 3/ (2 2 2 )/(3 ) (a k 2c (a k 2c ) 4ak )/(2 ) ( )/( )k a a c k a c k a a c k a c k< + − − − < − − + − − + < − + + +
2
2 2 3 3 3 3/ (2 2 2 )/(3 ) (a k 2c (a k 2c ) 4ak )/(2 ) ( )/( )k a a c k a c k a a c k a c k< + − − − < − − + − − + < − + + + .
Firstly, we discuss the choice of optimal coopetition 
strategy of SARFT.
Assume TC chooses competition, so
2 22 2
2 3 2 32 2
2 1
2 3 3
( 2 ) (6 2 4 )(a c ) (6 2c )
8b 8
(a c )
2b
G G
a c c a c c k ka k k
b
k c c
π π
+ − − − − ++ − − +
− = − =
+ − −
 (22)
As a+c2-2c3-k>0, a+c2-c3-k>0 must be right and 
pG2>pG1. That is to say, the optimal choice of SARFT is 
cooperation when TC chooses competiton; we compare q1 
with q2,
2 2
1 2
2
k (3 2) (2 ) (2 )
2 4
(4 3 ) (4 ) (4 )
4
a c a c kq q
b b
a c k
b
β β β
β β
β β β
β
+ − − − + + −
− = −
− + + − −
=　
 (23)
(4-3β)a+(4+β)c2-(4-β)k is the decreasing function of β, 
and(4-3β)a+(4+β)c2-(4-β)k= a+5c2-3k when β=1.We can 
get a+c2>3k from formula (13), so a+5c2-3k>0.Namely 
q1>q2 when β=1, so (4-3β)a+(4+β)c2-(4-β)k>0 must be set 
up, namely q1> q2 must be set up.
So, when TC chooses competition, the optimal strategy 
of SARFT is cooperation and provides IPTV with most 
program resources.
Assume TC chooses cooperation, so
( )2 23 3 3
4 3 2
2
3
2
k c (1 ) c c
4 b (1 ) (1 )
[(1 ) (1 )k 2 c ]
0
4 b(1 )
G G
a a ak k
b b
a
β β β β
π π
β β β
β β β β
β β
− − − +
− = − +
− −
− + − −
= ≥
−
　
 (24)
Namely, when TC chooses cooperation, the optimal 
stategy of SARFT is cooperation, and TC
won’t invist in making content and they cooperate to 
develop IPTV. Above all, we get conclusion1:
Conclusion 1: SARFT’ideal strategy is only 
cooperation with TC and don’t need to develop IPTV 
by himself and provides IPTV with most program 
resources. 
Now, it has been given SARFT chooses cooperation, 
TC chooses his optimal stategy based on the relative size 
between pD4 and pD2. He will choose cooperation when 
β meets pD4>pD2 and their optimal coopetition strategy 
between TC and SARFT is (cooperation, cooperation). 
He will choose competition if β meets pD4<pD2 and their 
optimal coopetition strategy is (competition, cooperation). 
3.  NUMERICAL SIMULATION ANALYSIS
The article designs a numerical simulation to visually 
observe the effect of profit-sharing on their choices of 
coopetition strategy. Assume a=350, b=0.2, c2=15, c3=10, 
k=5, Table 2 shows the effect of the variation of βon 
TC’profit and SARFT’s in the four patterns.
Firstly, let us observe their choices of optimal 
coopetition strategy.
When β≤k/a, the conditions for existence of Lowly 
Competitive Patter and Lowly Cooperative Pattern and 
Highly Cooperative Pattern don’t set up, they can only 
choose competition. Such as in Table 2, there only has the 
profits of Highly Competitive Patter whenβ≤0.01.
When k/a<β≤βx1(x1 refers to any value but not a 
specific value,below x2、x3 are the same meaning),the 
conditions for existence of Lowly Competitive Patter and 
Lowly Cooperative Pattern don’t set up and they choose 
from Highly Cooperative Pattern and Highly Competitive 
Patter. SARFT’ profit in Highly Competitive Patter is 
higher than it in Highly Cooperative Pattern, but TC’s is 
opposite. So, SARFT tends to choose Highly Competitive 
Patter and TC tends to choose Highly Cooperative 
Pattern. There is no equilibrium in theory. But in actual 
operation, as the leader, SARFT can don’t provide TC 
with content but develop IPTV himself through Two-
way network reconstruction. Then, TC has to choose 
making content himslef to compete with SARFT and it 
is impossible to allow SARFT to develop IPTV himself. 
Actually, neither SARFT nor TC is able to develop IPTV 
himself. SARFT’ profit will be less than zero and less 
than it in Highly Competitive Patter if TC develops IPTV 
himself, so SARFT will join in competition forming 
Highly Competitive Patter. The profit of TC will be less 
than zero and less than the profit in Highly Competitive 
Patter if SARFT develops IPTV himself, so TC will 
join in competition forming Highly Competitive Patter. 
Meanwhile, Highly Competitive Patter is more stable 
than highly cooperative Pattern. So, their final strategy 
still is competition. Such as in Table 2, pD1<pD4,pG1>pG4, 
and they finally choose Highly Competitive Patter 
when0.02≤β≤0.45.
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Table 2
The Effect of the Variation of βon TC’profit and SARFT’s in the Four Patterns
Highly 
Competitive Patter Lowly Cooperative Patter Lowly Competitive Patter Highly Cooperative Patter
β pD1 pG1 q1 q2 pD2 pG2 q1 q3 pD3 pG3 q1 pD4 pG4
0.01 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * (0) * *
0.02 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 250 73500 250
0.03 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 458 114851 1260
0.05 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 625 133594 3906
0.10 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 750 135000 11250
0.15 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 792 128976 18802
0.20 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 813 121875 26406
0.25 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 825 114469 34031
0.30 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 833 106944 41667
0.35 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 839 99365 49308
0.40 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 844 91758 56953
0.45 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 847 84134 64601
0.50 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 850 76500 72250
0.55 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 852 68860 79901
0.60 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 854 61215 87552
0.65 34031 68063 * (0) * * * (0) * * 856 53568 95204
0.70 34031 68063 1286 2 35817 76813 * (0) * * 857 45918 102857
0.75 34031 68063 1200 88 34531 76813 * (0) * * 858 38267 110510
0.80 34031 68063 1125 163 33406 76813 * (0) * * 859 30615 118164
0.85 34031 68063 1059 229 32414 76813 * (0) * * 860 22962 125818
0.90 34031 68063 1000 288 31531 76813 * (0) * * 861 15309 133472
0.94 34031 68063 957 330 30893 76813 * (0) * * 862 9185 139596
0.945 34031 68063 952 335 30817 76813 124 717 1240 140279 862 8420 140361
0.95 34031 68063 947 340 30742 76813 (0) * * * 862 7655 141127
0.96 34031 68063 938 350 30594 76813 (0) * * * 862 6124 142658
0.97 34031 68063 928 360 30449 76813 (0) * * * 862 4593 144189
0.98 34031 68063 918 369 30307 76813 (0) * * * 862 3062 145719
0.99 34031 68063 909 378 30168 76813 (0) * * * 862 1531 147250
Note: Record: (0) means the value isn’t larger than zero; it has no sense in actuality. * means the production of TC or SARFT is smaller than zero; 
there is no realistic basis of the profit.
When βx1<β≤ (2a+2c2-2k)/ (3a-c2-k), the conditions 
for existence of Lowly Competitive Patter and Lowly 
Cooperative Pattern don’t set up. Their profits in Highly 
Cooperative Pattern are higher than them in Highly 
Competitive Patter, both of them tend to choose Highly 
Cooperative Patter and cooperate with each other to 
develop IPTV. As in Table 2,pD1<pD4,pG1<pG4 when 
0.5≤β≤0.65,
Namely their profits are the largest in Highly 
Cooperative Pattern at that time. 
When (2a+2c2-2k)/(3a-c2-k)<β≤βx2, the conditions 
for existence of Lowly Competitive Patter don’t set up. 
At present, SARFT will choose cooperation to get more 
profit no matter TC chooses cooperation or competition. 
But TC’profit in Highly Cooperative Pattern is higher than 
it in Lowly Cooperative Patter. So they will cooperate 
with each other finally. Such as in Table 2, pG2>pG1,pD4>pD2 
if 0.7≤β≤0.75. Namely, both TC and SARFT choose 
cooperation.
W h e n 2x2 3 3(a k 2c (a k 2c ) 4ak )/(2 )aβ β< < − − + − − + ,  t h e 
conditions for existence of Lowly Competitive Patter still 
don’t set up. SARFT’optimal strategy is cooperation, but 
TC’ profit in Lowly Cooperative Patter is higher than it 
in Highly Cooperative Patter. Finally SARFT chooses 
cooperation and TC chooses competition forming Lowly 
Cooperative Patter. Such as in Table 2, pG2>pG1,pD2>pD4 
if 0.8≤β≤0.94. At present, SARFT only cooperates with 
TC, TC not only cooperates with SARFT but also makes 
content himself to develop IPTV.
When 23 3 3 3(a k 2c (a k 2c ) 4ak )/(2 ) ( )/( )a a c k a c kβ− − + − − + < < − + + +
, all the conditions for existence of the four patterns 
set up. SARFT will choose cooperation if TC chooses 
competition and still choose cooperation if TC chooses 
cooperation. As TC’ profit in Lowly Cooperative Patter 
is higher than it in Highly Cooperative Patter. Finally 
SARFT chooses cooperation and TC chooses competition. 
Such as in Table 2, pG2>pG1,pG4>pG3,pD2>pD4 ifβ=0.945,they 
will choose Lowly Cooperative Patter checking the 
Conculsion 1. 
When β>(a-c3+k)/(a+c3+k), the conditions for 
existence of Lowly Competitive Patter don’t set up. So 
SARFT chooses cooperation and TC chooses competition 
forming Lowly Cooperative Patter.   As in Table 
2,pG2>pG1,pD2>pD4 ifβ≥0.95, namely their optimal choice is 
Lowly Cooperative Patter.
Observe βx1,βx2, we can get
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x1 2 2 x2 3 3k/a (2a 2c 2k)/(3a c k) (a k 2c a k 2c 4ak ) / (2a)β β< < + − − − < < − − + − − +（） .
a>>c2,a>>k,so(2a+2c2-2k)/(3a-c2-k)≈0.7.Let βx1=0.7-
ξ1,βx2=0.7+ξ2(ξ1 andξ2 are constant),
so whenβ∈(0.7-ξ1,0.7+ξ2)(in other words, the profit-
sharing between SARFT and TC is in the neighborhood of 
seven-three), both of them will cooperate with each other.
Above all, SARFT and TC will choose Highly 
Competitive Patter whenβ≤0.7-ξ1 and Highly Cooperative 
Patter when 0.7-ξ1≤β≤0.7+ξ2 and Lowly Cooperative 
Patter whenβ≥0.7+ξ2.Meanwhile, we find their profits are 
the highest in Highly Cooperative Patter than others under 
the optimal coopetition stategies that they select when 
the profit-sharing is at other stages. The optimal profit is 
shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2
The Effect of the Variation of β on TC’Profit and SARFT’s
Secondly, the paper will discuss their optimal yield. If 
β≤0.7-ξ1, all of them will choose competition. At present, 
SARFT’yield is 850 units and TC’s is 412.5 units which 
he makes himself, so SARFT provides the most program 
resources. If 0.7-ξ1<β≤0.7+ξ2, both of them will choose 
cooperation, SARFT provides the content and TC is 
responsible for converying, all the content comes from 
SARFT. If β>0.7+ξ2 , SARFT will choose cooperation and 
TC will choose competition forming Lowly Cooperative 
Patter. Such as in Table 2, q1 is always higher than q2, 
SARFT also provides the most program resources.
CONCLUSION
The article embarks from the plight of IPTV development 
in China and builds a coopetition model between SARFT 
and TC based on the profit-sharing and explores their 
choices of coopetition strategy and optimal yield decisions 
under the different level of profit-sharing based on 
Stackelberg games. The conclusion is as follows:
The SARFT should provide IPTV with most 
program resources. Both SARFT and TC should choose 
competition if the profit-sharing between SARFT and TC 
is under the neighborhood of seven-three. Both of them 
should choose cooperation if the profit-sharing is in the 
neighborhood of seven-three. Their optimal coopetition 
strategy is (cooperation, competition) if the profit-sharing 
is above the neighborhood of seven-three. Meanwhile, 
their profits are the highest if both of them choose 
cooperation than others under the optimal coopetition 
stategies that they select when the profit-sharing is at 
other stages, they shoule controll the profit-sharing into 
the neighborhood of seven-three to choose the mutual 
cooperation strategy.
In Highly Cooperative Patter, SARFT is responsible 
for providing contene and TC is responsible for 
converying. For SARFT, his biggest advantage is content 
compared with TC. He should keep this advantage and 
fouse on improving the quality of program and developing 
new programs. He should adhere to the principle that 
content and service are supreme to improve the quality 
of program and increase the types of interactive program 
finally developing to the value-added service. For TC, he 
occupies the broadcast channel with the resources of the 
Internet broadband exports and Internet Date Center. He 
should speed up the construction of broadband network 
with the attitude of runner improving the carrying capacity 
of broanband and network speed to ensure the stability of 
network.
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